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Resolution Movement
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In less than a decade, alternative dispute resolu-
tion-ADR-has grown from a bravely-voiced hope to a congeries
of practices animated by the desire to resolve legal battles outside
the courtroom.1 ADR offers a way-station, or a series of them, be-
tween the probity of the adversary system and the flexibility of
private negotiations. 2 Though not without an ideology, ADR has
never had a unified theory to explain what it accomplishes and
how it works. But enough experience has accumulated by now to
permit a search for a more analytical understanding of ADR and
the lessons it might teach.
I. WHAT IS ADR?
The ADR roster includes such well-known processes as arbi-
tration, mediation, conciliation, and, perhaps, negotiation. These
processes can be used to settle existing disputes or to prevent dis-
putes from developing.3 There are also new hybrid devices that
borrow from courtroom procedure-including, most prominently,
the mini-trial.4 The roster may also be expanded to include the
tVisiting Associate Professor, New York Law School.
ttPresident, Center for Public Resources, New York.
1 Groups advocating ADR include the Legal Program of the Center for Public Re-
sources (including its Judicial Panel), the American Arbitration Association, the Special
Committee on Dispute Resolution of the American Bar Association, the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Section of the Association of American Law Schools, the Society of Professionals
In Dispute Resolution (known as SPIDR), and certain for-profit companies, for example,
EnDispute, Inc.
2 Cf. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 363-64
(1978) (discussing contract and adjudication as forms of social ordering involving different
modes of participation by affected parties); id. at 406-07 (discussing "mixed" forms).
3 See THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMimcN Socmty 94-97 (J. Lieberman ed. 1984) [here-
inafter cited as THE RoLE OF COURTS].
4 See, e.g., ERiKA S. FINE, THE CPR LEGAL PEOGRAM MN-TRAL WORKBOOK (1985); J.
HENRY & J. LBERmA, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RESOLVING LEGAL DispuTEs chs. 3-6
(1985); Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, LIGATION, Fall 1982, at 12; Parker & Radoff, The
Mini-Hearing: An Alternative to Protracted Litigation of Factually Complex Disputes, 38
Bus. LAW. 35 (1982).
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roles played by certain officials and quasi-officials5 (such as court-
appointed masters, special masters,6 and neutral experts), by pri-
vate persons retained as neutrals,7 by ombudsmen,8 and by private
judges.9 Changes in procedural rules to provide incentives to the
parties to settle (for example, further penalizing parties who turn
down reasonable settlement offers1") and the greater use of partial
summary judgment 1 might also be viewed as ADR techniques.
It is easier to point to discrete practices than to discern the
entire direction of the new movement. ADR has no generally ac-
cepted abstract or theoretical definition. But it does have a funda-
mental premise: it is worthwhile both to reduce the costs of resolv-
ing disputes, however this can be accomplished, and to improve
the quality of the final outcome. We offer a working definition of
ADR 12 as a starting point for analysis: ADR is a set of practices
5 See, e.g., Green, Getting Out of Court-Private Dispute Resolution, BOSTON B.J.,
May/June 1984, at 18; Alabama Inaugurates Court Expert Plan, ALTERNATwES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Aug. 1982, at 5.
' See, e.g., W. BRAZIL, G. HAZARD & P. RICE, MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTI-
CAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS (1983); Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to
Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of Authority and Restrictions?, 1983 Ah. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 143.
7 See, e.g., W. WARREN KNIGHT, JUSTICE OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM 6, 9, 35 (Premier Publish-
ing Co. 1984); Feinberg Mediates Private Antitrust Suit, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST
OF LITIGATION, July 1985, at 1; Morris, The Mini-Trial from the Perspective of a Neutral
Advisor, CPR LEGAL PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS, June 1983, at 21.
8 See, e.g., WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 39-56 (1966); Robbins &
Deane, A Non-Adversary Solution for Employee Conflicts, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST
OF LITIGATION, Aug. 1985, at 6; Rowe, The Non-Union Complaint System at M.LT.: An
Upward-Feedback, Mediation Model, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, April
1984, at 10; Rowe, The Non-Union Complaint system at MIT, in Proceedings of the First
National Conference on Resolving EEO Disputes without Litigation, Washington, D.C., Jan.
1984, at 24, 38; American Optical Co., Ombudsman Program, in id. at 76 (on file with The
University of Chicago Law Review).
' See, e.g., Green, Avoiding the Legal Logjam: Private Justice, California Style, in
CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 1982, at 65-89; Green,
Private Judging: A New Variation of Alternative Dispute Resolution, TRIAL, Oct. 1985, at
36.
10 See Note, Rule 68: An Offer You Can't Afford to Refuse, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 373
(1985) (suggesting alteration of rule 68 to allow either party to invoke the rule, to limit
judicial discretion in determining the reasonableness of an offer, and to allow adequate dis-
covery before offers); Note, Rule 68: A "New" Tool for Litigation, 1978 DUKE L.J. 889 (sug-
gesting increased judicial discretion in the rule 68 cost-shifting provision).
1 For an analysis and critique of current summary judgment practice in the federal
courts, see Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine
Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).
"' This definition is distinctly different from that implied by one of the leading critics
of ADR, Professor Owen M. Fiss-namely, that ADR is the creation of incentives or pres-
sures that force litigants to settle. See Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1670 (1985). For
a response to Fiss's critique of ADR, see infra text accompanying notes 39-47.
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and techniques that aim (1) to permit legal disputes to be resolved
outside the courts for the benefit of all disputants; (2) to reduce
the cost of conventional litigation and the delays to which it is or-
dinarily subject;13 or (3) to prevent legal disputes that would other-
wise likely be brought to the courts.14
This paper focuses on the first part of the definition-private
resolution of existing legal disputes outside the courts. 15 The "dis-
putes" with which ADR is centrally concerned should be distin-
guished from "problems," "grievances," or "claims."' 6 Problems
are the troubles that affect the human lot, such as damage from
storms or sudden illness. Grievances are those problems that affect
a particular person, but which may or may not have a particular
person or group as the cause of the distress. When the sufferer asks
the person thought to be causing the grievance to forbear, the
grievance has become a claim or complaint. But a dispute arises
only when the one against whom the complaint is lodged fails to
respond satisfactorily to the aggrieved party. And a "legal" dispute
arises only when the claim is grounded in a legal entitlement.
ADR, then, should be viewed as a set of practices that are truly
alternatives to the courts for the resolution of disputes that could
legitimately be disposed of by judicial decree.
Finally, ADR can be "alternative" in one of two senses: be-
cause the parties privately choose to avoid litigation (or to termi-
nate it short of judgment), or because legal rules require or permit
the courts to send the dispute elsewhere (as in court-annexed arbi-
tration). The analysis that follows largely takes the perspective of
parties who have privately and voluntarily chosen to resolve their
13 Speed should not be seen as the sine qua non of a non-adjudicative process. Some
ADR processes take longer than traditional adjudication-for example, the joint review pro-
cess. See Conference Proceedings, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, Denver, Colo-
rado, March 22-23, 1984.
14 This third part of the definition is responsive to public debate over the nature and
growth of litigiousness in the United States. See JETHRO LmEBEmAN, THE LMGIOUS SociTY
(1981); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REv. 4 (1983).
15 Nevertheless, it is well to remember that if the aim is to reduce the incidence of
litigation in the United States and its attendant costs, it is highly relevant to find ways to
prevent disputes from arising and to minimize the cost of litigating those disputes that must
go to court.
16 This distinction is developed in Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Trans-
formation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming .... 15 LAW. & Soc'Y REv. 631 (1981);
see also THE ROLE OF CouRTs, supra note 3, at 86-87; Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims,
and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525 (1981).
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disputes outside the formal procedures of adjudication.17
II. THE THEORY. BEHIND ADR
A. Opening the Lines of Communication
What often prevents disputes from being resolved is a failure
to communicate stemming from a lack of trust between the parties.
ADR is premised on the hypothesis that if the parties could over-
come this distrust, they could voluntarily reach a settlement as
just as the result a court would impose.
The adversary process-the engine of the adjudicatory sys-
tem-operates on a theory of fundamental distrust: Never put
faith in the adversary. Litigation thus becomes formal, tricky, divi-
sive, time-consuming, and distorting. These characteristics are re-
flected in the common image of discovery in large-scale commercial
cases that takes years to conduct, in the careful coaching and prep-
aration of witnesses, and in the skillful impeachment of sound wit-
nesses during cross-examination.' In contrast, the creation of trust
is central to the design of many ADR processes.
Consider the example of the mini-trial. The mini-trial is not in
fact a trial at all, but a highly-structured settlement process. Be-
cause it is a flexible device that can be tailored to the precise needs
of the parties, no single procedural model of the mini-trial has yet
prevailed. But in general, the known mini-trials share many of the
following characteristics: 19
1. The parties negotiate a set of procedural ground rules (a
protocol) that will govern the nonbinding mini-trial.
2. The time for preparation is relatively short-between six
weeks and three months-and the amount of discovery is relatively
limited.
3. The hearing itself is sharply abbreviated-usually no more
17 The narrow focus of this paper should not be taken to mean that the movement
among judges to explore alternatives to traditional procedures is not central to ADR. In
fact, the ADR movement perhaps had its modern beginnings at the Pound Conference, at
which Professor Frank E.A. Sander introduced the concept of the "multi-door court-
house"-that courts could use different processes to resolve disputes in different "rooms."
Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 126-34 (1976). This paper suggests,
however, that the perspective of private parties voluntarily choosing among available proce-
dures should form the baseline of any evaluation of the judicial adaptation of ADR
techniques.
Is For critiques of the adversarial system, see MARVnN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 3-69
(1981), and ANNE STRIcK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 37-57 (1977).
19 These characteristics are discussed in some detail in J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra
note 4, at 26-35.
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than two days.
4. The hearing is often conducted by a third-party neutral,
typically called the "neutral advisor."
5. The case is presented to representatives of the parties with
authority to settle; there is no judge or jury.
6. The lawyers present their "best" case; they do not have
time to delve into side issues.
7. Immediately after the hearing, the party representatives
meet privately to negotiate a settlement.
8. If they cannot reach a settlement, the neutral advisor may
render an advisory opinion on how he thinks a judge would rule if
the case were to go to court.
9. The proceedings are confidential: the parties generally
commit themselves to refrain from disclosing details of the pro-
ceedings to any outsider.
Several observations are in order about the trust-building ca-
pacity of the mini-trial. First, the very process of negotiating the
protocol tends to foster trust.2 0 Second, by concentrating on their
best possible case, the lawyers usually feel constrained to discuss
the central issues. Third, the kind of lawyerly hairsplitting, name-
calling, and pettifogging that might delight courtroom regulars
would leave the business executives to whom mini-trials are
presented singularly unamused. Finally, the presence at the hear-
ing of a neutral advisor, to whom both parties have consented, en-
hances the prospect that they will credit any advisory opinion that
he renders.
Mediation leads to the building of trust in a somewhat differ-
ent way. Mediation permits a neutral to learn intimate facts from
both sides that they would never have shared with each other in
the course of trial preparation. By building on the parties' trust in
the mediator, the process thus allows the parties to explore worka-
ble options. With the knowledge that he gains, the mediator can
learn how far apart the parties are and devise ways of bridging the
gap.
One lesson that ADR teaches, then, is that processes designed
to restore and build trust can overcome the suspicion and mutual
hostility fostered by the adversary system and can lead the parties
20 It might be objected that this prospect is circular: only if the parties trust each other
at least to a limited extent will they agree to conduct a mini-trial at all. But experience
suggests that they need not trust each other very much at the outset. Their need to negoti-
ate in order to gain access to the forum tends to foster trust, and their desire to save further
litigation costs might simply overwhelm the distrust.
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to settle their differences. When the substantive outcome is com-
pared to the likely result in court-and the costs of continued liti-
gation are weighed in the balance-both parties generally benefit
from ADR.
B. The Superiority of Results
A working hypothesis of ADR is that the results of ADR are
often superior to court judgments-and even more clearly superior
to conventional settlements. Although the hypothesis is difficult to
test, it is supported by several considerations.
First, adjudication is characterized by a "winner-take-all" out-
come. 21 This cannot be wholly true, for jury damage awards can
work compromises, and the parties can shape consent decrees
through bargaining. Nevertheless, in many cases, the fundamental
issue of liability can be resolved only by holding for the plaintiff or
the defendant. ADR, by contrast, is not bound by the zero-sum
game of adjudication. While we have defined ADR as concerned
with "legal disputes," participants in ADR are free to go beyond
the legal definition of the scope of their dispute. They can search
for creative solutions to the problem that gave rise to the dispute,
and those solutions may be far more novel than any remedy a
court has the power to provide. In a mini-trial held by Texaco and
Borden, for example, the parties resolved a breach-of-contract
claim and antitrust counterclaim totaling in the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars by renegotiating the entire contract for the supply
of natural gas. Both parties claimed a net gain.22 No court could
have ordered the parties to renegotiate; at best a judge or jury
could only have compromised on the amount of damages it
awarded the "winner."
Second, in classes of cases involving complex institutions, ne-
gotiations conducted by executives are likely to yield results supe-
rior to those conducted by the lawyers.2 3 The executives are far
,1 See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33-35 (1982); Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 783-89 (1984).
'2 See Texaco-Borden Antitrust Mini-Trial Sets Record, ALTERNATrES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LGATION, March 1983, at 1, 3.
23 Such is the common claim in gatherings of ADR proponents, although it is difficult
to document. In remarks at the midyear meeting of the CPR Legal Program, Professor
James Sebenius of the Kennedy School of Government suggested that managers negotiate
better than lawyers because they can invent options that go beyond the narrow focus of the
issues in dispute. The best negotiation, he suggested, occurs when managers are teamed with
lawyers. Management Roundtable: Roles of Senior Executives in Preventing, Managing,
1986]
The University of Chicago Law Review
more familiar than their lawyers with the nuances of their business
and can respond more quickly and creatively to proposals raised by
their counterparts. We do not mean to diminish the role or respon-
sibilities of lawyers in the negotiations; their legal knowledge will
often be crucial to successful settlements and good lawyer-negotia-
tors may be more skillful than poorly trained executive-negotia-
tors. Nevertheless, the business executive may be presumed to be
less distracted by the shadow the law casts over the dispute;24 the
executive will look at the complete business picture, unconstrained
by the narrow parameters imposed by legal doctrine.25
Third, direct involvement by the client can obviate or mini-
mize difficulties arising from the self-interest of lawyers. This point
may be particularly instructive for judges. By requiring clients to
attend pretrial conferences, judges can be sure that the clients
know and approve of the propositions their lawyers will assert in
court on their behalf.26
Fourth, ADR techniques and processes can be far more sys-
tematic than the horsetrading of conventional settlement negotia-
tions. Settlement negotiations are often perceived as consisting of
sharp tactics and bluff. 27 "Unprincipled" negotiations occur in
large part because the parties lack a means of communicating with
each other. ADR processes permit realistic assessments of whether
offers and counteroffers are in good faith.
Fifth, properly designed ADR processes make it more likely
that settlement decisions will be based on the merits of disputes.
As Richard A. Posner has suggested, various factors may contrib-
ute to more or less settlement.28 Delay in the judicial system tends
to "increase[] the likelihood of settlement by reducing the stakes
in the case," in part because delay diminishes the present value of
the ultimate award.29 Other factors include rules governing pre-
judgment interest and the availability of pretrial discovery.30 This
and Resolving Disputes, CPR LEGAL PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS, Feb. 1985, at 28.
2 Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 225 (1982).
2' See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21 (contrasting adversarial and problem-
solving modes of negotiation).
28 See Federal Judges Urge CEOs to Come to Chambers Early, ALTERNATriES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LMGATION, Jan. 1983, at 5 [hereinafter cited as CEOs].
27 For a contrary view, see R. FISHER & W. URY, GEriNG TO YES (1981).
28 See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-29 (1973).
29 Id. at 420 (under certain assumptions).
30 Id. at 421-27. Not all discovery provisions facilitate settlement according to this
model. See id. at 426-27 (discussing insurance-coverage and medical-examination rules).
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analysis could lead the courts to advocate policies that would in-
crease delay (or other costs of litigation) in order to prompt settle-
ment. The resulting settlements would not necessarily be just,
however, because they would not have taken account of power dis-
parities. The party with the more meritorious claim might not pre-
vail because he is too poor to amass the requisite evidence through
the discovery process. Society may have the power to foster higher
settlement rates by manipulating the factors that induce people to
stay out of court, but many proponents of ADR would not view
such policies as consonant with the ADR philosophy. A dispute
should not merely be settled; it should be settled justly.
As a simple example of this difficulty, the divorce mediation
model has lately come under attack from feminists and others pre-
cisely because in that model-where husband and wife are in a
room with a mediator attempting to resolve their financial affairs
and custody arrangements-neither participant has an attorney,
and the spouse with superior knowledge and staying power will be
able to force a better and possibly unjust settlement.31 Responsible
proponents of ADR do not advocate settlement at any cost. The
ADR processes now being implemented are designed to reflect the
dual notion that settlements should be both just and efficient.
Finally, a sixth reason to think that ADR leads to "better"
outcomes is that the use of private neutrals permits the parties to
submit their dispute to one with greater expertise in their particu-
lar subject than does the luck of the draw in the courtroom. Many
complex disputes involve data and concepts that lie beyond the
knowledge of generalist judges (and of all juries). The ADR neutral
can be selected for a particular expertise, thus saving the parties
the cost of educating the fact-finder (and the risk of failing to do
so). Moreover, if the parties have personally participated in select-
ing the neutral, they may be psychologically disposed to accept his
statement of the case, whether it is a binding decision (as in arbi-
tration) or an advisory opinion (as in a mini-trial).
.. Compare Herman, McKenry & Weber, Mediation and Arbitration Applied to Fam-
ily Conflict Resolution, 34 ARB. J. 17, 19 (1979) ("successful negotiation of the settlement
agreement includes equalization of power"), with Kressel, Deutsch, Joffe, Tuchman & Wat-
son, Mediated Negotiations in Divorce and Labor Disputes: A Comparison, 15 CONCmIA-
TON COURTS REV. 9, 11-12 (1977) (since power disparities create "strong pressures on the
mediator" to side with the wife and threaten the mediator's impartiality, each side should
be provided with an advocate).
1986]
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III. Is ADR SOCIALLY VALUABLE? A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS
Proponents of ADR suggest that its value lies in reducing the
burden on courts and disputants. Alarmed at the ever-increasing
numbers of cases filed, 2 the Chief Justice33 and others3 4 see arbi-
tration and other practices as ways of removing large individual
cases and even large classes of cases from the courts, thus remov-
ing a burden from the shoulders of judges (while shifting it to
someone else). To the delight of their critics, they have occasion-
ally forgotten that whether this change is beneficial depends on the
relative justice and expense of dispositions through formal in-court
adjudication and through less formal out-of-court methods of dis-
pute resolution.
Critics of ADR, like Owen Fiss,3 5 suggest that ADR propo-
nents mistake the function of courts as "mere" dispute resolvers.
By diverting cases from courts, society loses the benefit of court-
sanctioned judgments:
The advocates of ADR are led. . . to exalt the idea of settle-
ment more generally because they view adjudication as a pro-
cess to resolve disputes. They act as though courts arose to
resolve quarrels between neighbors who had reached an im-
passe and turned to a stranger for help. Courts are seen as an
institutionalization of the stranger and adjudication is viewed
as the process by which the stranger exercises power ....
The dispute-resolution story makes settlement appear as a
perfect substitute for judgment . . . by trivializing the reme-
dial dimensions of a lawsuit, and also by reducing the social
31 Case filings, the common measure of litigation rates, are misleading because so many
filed cases are neither heard nor adjudicated in court. See THE ROLE OF COURTS, supra note
3, at 29.
33 See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B. J. 274, 276-77 (1982) (advo-
cating private binding arbitration as "'a better way to do it' ").
U See, e.g., Derek Bok, The President's Report to the Board of Overseers of Harvard
College, 1981-1982, reprinted in N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1983, at 8, and N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1983,
at 31; Cannon, Contentious and Burdensome Litigation: A Need for Alternatives, 63 NAT'L
FORUM, Fall 1983, at 10; Ehrlich, Legal Pollution, N.Y. TMEs MAO., Feb. 8, 1976, at 17, 21;
Footlick, Too Much Law?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 42, 47; Manning, Hyperlexis: Our
National Disease, 71 Nw. U.,. RE v. 767, 780 (1977); Rosenberg, Let's Everybody Litigate?,
50 TE . L. REV. 1349, 1360-63 (1972); Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice, ATLANric
MONTHLY, July 1979, at 25.
'5 We cite Fiss repeatedly here because he is the most articulate opponent of an ADR
perspective; hence it is useful to test the propositions of ADR against his critique. We say
"a" perspective because, as suggested in the text, Fiss tends to emphasize the perspective of
the judge imposing an "alternative" procedure on unwilling litigants, rather than that of the
consumer of legal services making a rational choice among available options.
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function of the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes: In
that story, settlement appears to achieve exactly the same
purpose as judgment-peace between the parties-but at con-
siderably less expense to society.36
Fiss also argues that advocates of ADR have an unstated polit-
ical agenda: to keep the activist state from meddling with powerful
private economic interests.3 7 Finally, Fiss suggests that settlements
lack the legitimacy of cases fully adjudicated to judgment."
Four responses to this critique are in order. One short answer
to Fiss is that most ADR proponents make no claim for shunting
all, or even most, litigation into alternative forums. The ADR
movement of the 1980s does not suppose that every legal dispute
has a non-judicial solution. Indeed, the ADR literature recognizes
that some types of cases are not suited to resolution outside the
courtroom, including particularly cases in which the plaintiff seeks
a declaration of law by the court.3 9 Fiss overlooks this accepted
limitation of ADR because he assumes, at least implicitly, that all
cases resemble Brown v. Board of Education.40 But, of course, they
do not. It seems obvious that large classes of cases are.not so con-
sequential, and do not call for the definitive ruling of a judge or
the imprimatur of an official organ of the state. Automobile acci-
dents, uncontested divorces, breaches of contract, and other com-
mon types of suits do not cry out to be memorialized in the official
reports, and, in any event, most are settled far short of trial.
3' Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075, 1085 (1984).
', "Chief Justice Burger is not moved by love, or by a desire to find new ways to re-
store or preserve loving relationships, but rather by concerns of efficiency and politics. He
seeks alternatives to litigation in order to reduce the caseload of the judiciary or, even more
plausibly, to insulate the status quo from reform by the judiciary." Fiss, supra note 12, at
1670.
" Fiss, supra note 36, at 1082 (rejecting the notion that settlement is legitimate be-
cause it is consent-based; instead, settlements are approved based on an imagined result at
trial, without the benefit of adversary presentation).
'3 In this sense, the current ADR movement has a different outlook from its precursors.
Much of the energy of early reform movements was devoted to a search for a comprehensive
elimination of formal adjudication. See generally JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WrrHouT LAW?
(1983) (contrasting early community-based modes of dispute settlement with the post-1960s
"legalization" of these alternative modes). That is not the core of the modern argument.
See, e.g., Civil Case Backlogs in Federal District Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 197 (1984) (state-
ment of James F. Davis) ("If there are overriding legal principles in a dispute, constitutional
matters, statutory construction matters, grudge cases, and the like, a minitrial probably is
not going to succeed.").
40 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Fiss, supra note 12, at 1670 ("It would be nice if the blacks
in Chicago. . . did not have to go to court in order to obtain all the Constitution promises,
and instead were able to work things out with the school board.").
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A second response to Fiss's critique is that his "conspiracy
theory" of ADR is dubious. Many people who seek to use ADR are
scarcely "powerful" economic interests-ADR is not limited to
adoption by Fortune 500 companies. Moreover, ADR does not dis-
pense with community norms. All dispute resolution takes place
with an eye toward existing alternatives-including litigation.41 Fi-
nally, the choice to employ ADR is made by parties who have de-
termined that the injustice resulting from delay and the prohibi-
tive costs of pursuing a case through the courts (direct
expenditures for lawyers and expenses, as well as significant indi-
rect expenditures, like lost opportunity costs) far outweigh any pu-
tative injustice stemming from the decision to forgo judgment by
the court.
A third response to Fiss is that not all questions need to be
answered. An open society needs the tension of open questions;
parties who settle do not thereby foreclose answers at some later
time when matters of principle are truly at stake and the issues
cannot be compromised. Fiss agrees that avoidance has a value to
society, "which sometimes thrives by masking its basic contradic-
tions. ' 42 He questions, however, whether settlement will result in
too much avoidance.4 But we know of no way to measure the ap-
propriateness of avoidance. Furthermore, Fiss's concern is one-
sided. We should be equally concerned to prevent courts from ren-
dering judgment when settlement is more appropriate.
Finally, Fiss's position is seriously weakened by his failure to
offer proof that court judgments are more just. He says, for exam-
ple, that "[a] djudication is more likely to do justice than conversa-
tion, mediation, arbitration, settlement, rent-a-judge, mini-trials,
community moots or any other contrivance of ADR, precisely be-
cause it vests the power of the state in officials who act as trustees
for the public, who are highly visible, and who are committed to
reason."
44
Does ADR reach a just result or merely an expedient one?
How can one measure the justice of a private settlement? The
question is important, but it has not been well discussed in the
ADR literature-no doubt because it is so difficult a proposition to
test. Whatever the answer, it seems fair to ask the same questions
41 See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
42 Fiss, supra note 36, at 1086.
43 Id.
44 Fiss, supra note 12, at 1673.
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of courts. In theory, courts are committed to reason, but in prac-
tice much stands in their way. Some judges are dispassionate and
disinterested seekers after justice, but not all are. And all judges
are busy; it is a fair assumption that they do not have sufficient
time to devote to any single case.45 Moreover, the maneuvering of
partisan lawyers alone is often enough to ensure that justice will
not be done.46
A perhaps more controversial response to Fiss's argument
about the quality of outcomes is that in certain important classes
of cases-cases involving public institutions like schools, hospitals,
and prisons (the very cases that particularly interest Fiss)-courts
themselves invoke processes that are firmly lodged in the ADR ar-
senal. Stories that describe litigation over unconstitutional prison
conditions, inhumane mental hospital conditions, and segregated
schools frequently depict the judge acting as mediator, helping the
parties to negotiate the remedy the court will impose by consent
decree.47 If the courts themselves find these processes useful or
even necessary, chances are good that the same processes can be as
beneficial when invoked outside the courts.
IV. APPLICATIONS FOR JUDGES
It is in an important sense anomalous to suppose that judges
can discern in the private ADR movement any practical applica-
tions for use within the courts, since the very premise of ADR is
that it is a consensual process designed to circumvent judicial pro-
cess. If the parties are before the court, they are presumably there
because they seek adjudicatory procedures to resolve their dispute
or because they could not agree on private procedures to do so. In
either event, judges may not impose procedures outside the scope
of the rules. Nevertheless, the modest success of ADR so far sug-
gests two possibilities, one more difficult than the other.
One possibility lies in changing the rules themselves. Proce-
4 For a general discussion of the problem of delay, see THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND
THE LAW EXPLOSION 31 (H. Jones ed. 1964) ("[A] lot more is said about court delay than is
known about it. But how thick a supporting dossier need one collect to take a stand against
sin? And that is what, by common repute, delay is-an unmitigated evil.").
46 See M. FRANKEL, supra note 18, at 21-38.
47 See, e.g., Chayes, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 H~Av. L. REv. 465, 481-86 (1980) (increase in judicial participation as litigation complexi-
ties increase); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1296-1302 (1976) (same); see also MARTIN SHAPmO, COURTS 8-9 (1981)
("Mediating is not to be seen as an antithesis to judging, but rather as a component in
judging.").
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dures too cumbersome could be made more flexible; procedures too
unlikely to be invoked could be made more accessible. The object
here is not to design procedures that will keep cases from coming
to court, not to aid judges with overfull calendars. Rather, the
courts could, by local rule or legislative action when necessary,
streamline processes that are underused.
Thus two ADR advocates have recently proposed streamlining
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to permit cases to go forward
along a "fast track. 48 They propose that the parties be permitted
to elect an expedited schedule of discovery that would guarantee a
trial date within 12 months.
Another type of ADR within the courts is the summary jury
trial. The brainchild of U.S. District Judge Thomas D. Lambros
(N.D. Ohio), the summary jury trial is the courtroom equivalent of
the mini-trial. A case is presented during the course of a single day
to a mock jury consisting of jurors drawn from the real jury pool;
the jurors do not know until after they have rendered their verdict
that it is not binding. In thus giving the parties a "real" verdict,
the procedure creates an incentive for them to settle their case pri-
vately. The record to date suggests a high settlement rate (more
than ninety percent in Judge Lambros's courtroom).49 The sum-
mary jury trial has been adopted in a number of federal courts,
either by local rule50 or by individual judges,51 and has been for-
mally endorsed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.52
Even with rules changes, these devices require the consent of
the parties, and so in that sense can be considered ADR mecha-
nisms. 53 Consent is central to the other possible approach to using
'8 See McMillan & Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431 (1985).
'9 See M.-D. JACOUBOVITCH & C. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE NORTHERN Dis-
TRICT OF OHIO (Federal Judicial Center 1982); A Compendium of Judicial ADR, ALTERNA-
TIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Special Issue 1985, at 6 [hereinafter cited as
Compendium].
50 E.g., W.D. MICH. Cmv. R. 44.
'51 The districts in which judges have used the summary jury trials include Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida (S.D.), Illinois (N.D.), Massachusetts, Michigan (E.D), Montana, Ohio
(S.D.), Oklahoma (W.D.), and Pennsylvania (M.D. and E.D.). Compendium, supra note 49,
at 7; Ranii, Summary Jury Trials Gain Favor, Nat'l L.J., June 10, 1985, at 1, 30.
52 "Resolved, that the Judicial Conference endorses the experimental use of summary
jury trials as a potentially effective means of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of
potentially lengthy civil jury cases." Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Washington, D.C., Sept. 19-20, 1984, at 88; see also Compendium, supra
note 49, at 4, col. 3.
11 Even where participation in the summary jury trial process is mandatory when the
judge deems the process appropriate, as in the Northern District of Ohio, the process may
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ADR in court: developing procedures permitted under existing
rules in order to incorporate the trust between the adversaries that
is the central feature of all ADR devices. This approach, already
used by judges in many contexts, calls essentially for involving the
parties themselves in the litigation, not merely as witnesses but as
active participants with the lawyers.
Thus, to take the simplest example, a judge could require ex-
ecutives of disputing corporations to appear in chambers with the
lawyers at a pretrial conference under rule 16 .5 As already noted,55
the judge at the pretrial conference can often expedite a case by
insuring that the litigants themselves understand exactly what
their lawyers are doing. 6
V. THE FUTURE OF ADR
The best use for ADR may be to resolve the types of cases
that are extremely difficult or exceedingly costly to resolve in
court. ADR is now being used to resolve multi-party cases.57 This
range of actions is perhaps typified by the more than 30,000 asbes-
tos-related personal injury cases flooding courtrooms across the
country.58 But even ordinary commercial and antitrust cases in
which many defendants are sued in the same action can be ren-
nonetheless be seen as consensual because the summary jury verdict is not binding.
" And see especially, FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7), permitting the parties to "consider and
take action with respect to ... the possiblity of settlement or the use of extrajudicial proce-
dures to resolve the dispute."
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
86 "In one case, the parties were about to embark on a series of depositions to establish
whether one of the companies was doing business in Illinois under the long-arm statute.
There had been considerable wrangling by the attorneys before the conference, and they
went at it heatedly in front of [U.S. District] Judge [John F.] Grady [N.D. Illinois]. As it
happened, the judge had asked that the two chief executive officers be present; they listened
to the debate more and more incredulously, until one finally blurted out: 'There isn't any
question that we do business in Illinois.' Potential months of discovery was thus elimi-
nated." See CEOs, supra note 26 at 5.
17 It has become increasingly apparent that the conventional tools of litigation are in-
adequate to resolve these kinds of disputes. The most compelling illustration is the specta-
cle of an asbestos proceeding housed in a converted auditorium, in which the judge felt
compelled to install traffic signals on his desk to indicate which of the more than 100 law-
yers wished to object to the admission of evidence. Galante, Megatrials, Nat'l L.J., March
25, 1985, at 1, 36.
" DEBORAH HENSLER, ASBESTOS IN THE CouRTs: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS
24 (1985). For other types of multi-party cases, see, for example, MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY
COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHMLD 175-246 (1985); Levine, Gilding
the Lilly, A DES Update, TIAL, Dec. 1984, at 18; A.H. Robins Files Chapter 11, Cites
Dalkon Litigation, L.A. Daily L.J., Aug. 22, 1985, at 1.
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dered more manageable by the use of ADR techniques.5 9
Attempting to fit a many-sided dispute into the two-sided con-
tour of the adversary system can be worse than jamming the pro-
verbial square peg into the round hole. More flexible processes are
often necessary to bring matters to a successful and equitable reso-
lution. In the asbestos litigation, mediation has tentatively proved
itself by bringing together more than thirty producers and insurers
in a pact, mediated by former Yale Law School Dean Harry H.
Wellington, to submit claims for rapid payout to the so-called As-
bestos Claims Facility. Although the Facility will not automatically
honor any claim presented, use of the Facility is expected to be
faster than litigation, and should radically simplify the proof re-
quired of plaintiffs. The mediation took two years-far shorter
than the time most asbestos cases have taken to get to trial.6 0
In the end, however, we have only begun to identify the kinds
of disputes likely to be amenable to the techniques of ADR. Dis-
putes arise for various reasons-greed, envy, anger, revenge, princi-
ple-and can be settled (or not) for various reasons. Disputes can
have very different legal characteristics. Likewise, the relationship
between the parties varies from dispute to dispute: parties with a
historic and continuing relationship will presumably have a differ-
ent reaction to a dispute and its potential settlement than parties
who have met on just this one occasion and will never meet again.
How these axes of difference relate is an important and unresolved
question.
We therefore need a typology of disputes to help determine
which kinds of cases are amenable to ADR and which should be
left to the traditional devices of adjudication. Among the relevant
factors are: the number, nature, and relationships among the par-
ties; the relief sought; the nature of the claim; the nature and stan-
dard of proof; the cost of formal adjudication (including potential
delays); and the financial strength and risk aversion of the parties
(including the degree of plaintiff's urgency for relief and the
strength of defendant's desire to delay judgment). A matrix of
these factors will no doubt be complex, and we must resist the
"' See Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, 53 ANTITRusT L.J. 271 (1984); War-
shauer, Litigation Management Techniques, ALTERNATVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGA-
TION, Nov. 1984, at 7.
1o There are no published statistics on how long asbestos cases take to get to trial. An
educated guess by Professor Eric D. Green, a special master in the consolidated asbestos
proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, is that they range
from eighteen months to eleven years. Conversation with Eric Green, Center for Public Re-
sources, March 1986.
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temptation to think that mathematical formulas will reveal with
any precision which process is most appropriate for a particular
kind of case. But without some deeper understanding of the crucial
differences among types of disputes, we will never be able to weigh
the competing claims of justice and efficiency, and to design the
processes that will best serve both.
